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INNOCENCE FOUND:
RETRIBUTION, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AND
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Judith M. Barger*
Although a majority of the United States Supreme Court theoretically
accepts that the state-sanctioned killing of a factually innocent person
is unconstitutional, it has been reluctant to announce a workable
standard for individuals raising postconviction freestanding claims of
actual innocence in capital cases. This Article explores how such
claims should be addressed. It begins by examining the distinctions the
Court has drawn between freestanding claims of innocence and those
asserted in connection with other constitutional violations. Although the
Court theoretically recognized the former in Herrera v. Collins, it has
failed to articulate a clear standard to govern these claims, and it left
great confusion regarding the available remedy. This Article argues
that the development of these standards and remedies must be guided
by the retributive principles that serve as the basis of the Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. With these principles in mind, this
Article then proposes a tiered system of review for freestanding
innocence claims that employs different standards depending on the
remedy the petitioner seeks. This tiered system of standards and
remedies would accord appropriate deference to the States’ interests in
finality and preservation of prosecutorial and judicial resources, confer
appropriate weight to the substantial liberty interests of the petitioner
subject to execution, and give valid effect to the requirements of the
Eighth Amendment as it applies to capital cases.

* Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law, J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center. I would like to thank Akiah Highsmith (J.D. Candidate, 2013) for his invaluable
assistance in researching this article and also Professors Michael Loudenslager, Dale Rubin, Alan
Oxford, and M. Scott Boone for their informative feedback and advice.
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“Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject
it merely because it comes late.”1
For the last nineteen years,2 the Supreme Court has wrestled
with the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution or imprisonment of a factually innocent3 person
(hereinafter referred to as “innocent person”). In the developing
jurisprudence on the issue, a majority of the Court agrees that statesanctioned killing of an innocent person would violate the Eighth
Amendment but has struggled to develop a workable standard to
apply when an individual raises the issue in light of evidence that is
discovered postconviction. In fact, although the Court has implicitly
recognized that an individual may make a postconviction
freestanding claim of actual innocence in capital cases, the vague and
onerous “standard” it applies has proven virtually impossible to
meet.4
The Court’s reluctance to announce a workable standard seems
to derive from two interrelated sources of concern: (1) interference
with the States’ interest in finality in criminal cases; and (2) the
burden of having to retry cases with “stale” evidence.5 However,
neither of these concerns is significant enough to overcome the
Supreme Court’s own Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence,
which focuses more acutely on the actual guilt of an individual as a
condition of execution.
In the handful of innocence cases considered by the Supreme
Court since its ruling in Herrera v. Collins,6 the Court has refused to
announce any specific standard, stating only that such claims require
1. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutional propriety of executing an innocent
person in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
3. “Factually” or “actually” innocent are terms that refer to an individual who did not
commit the crime for which he or she was convicted and sentenced to death. This definition
should be distinguished from one that includes individuals who committed the charged crime but
should not have been convicted due to a constitutional or other procedural error occurring at their
trial.
4. The Supreme Court has yet to identify a set of facts that would satisfy this standard.
5. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
6. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).

4

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

an “extraordinarily high”7 burden and a “truly persuasive
demonstration”8 of innocence. However, when the death penalty is at
issue, the Eighth Amendment requires a greater level of reliability to
sustain an execution. This Article discusses how claims of innocence
should be addressed within the context of capital punishment.9 The
Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence, which relies heavily on
retributive theory, supports the application of a lesser standard when
considering the issue of execution, as opposed to conviction. This
discussion is divided into three parts: (1) the process of
postconviction claims of innocence; (2) retributive themes in the
Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence; and (3) considerations of
innocence in the context of pending executions.
Part I of this Article explains how innocence claims are analyzed
in the postconviction setting, while Part II discusses the Supreme
Court’s reliance on retributive theories in its capital jurisprudence.
Finally, Part III of this Article proposes a standard to address
postconviction claims of innocence that is consistent with the Eighth
Amendment’s retributive-based requirements in capital cases.
I. POSTCONVICTION
CLAIMS OF INNOCENCE
Once an individual has been convicted by a judge or jury, and
all direct appeals have been exhausted, there are two methods for
raising a claim of actual innocence in federal court. The first, and
most commonly used, method is to use a claim of innocence as a
“gateway” to argue other constitutional issues that have been
procedurally defaulted.10 If the reviewing court finds that “it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror” would have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new evidence
of innocence, the defendant will be permitted access to a habeas
forum to argue substantive constitutional issues, despite any
7. Id. at 417.
8. Id. at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
9. This article does not defend the unworkable and yet to be defined “standard” announced
by the Supreme Court in Herrera, which undoubtedly requires significant adjustment to
legitimately enforce the Court’s holding. Instead, it focuses on a narrower issue relating
specifically to the constitutionality of executing someone who has made a colorable claim of
innocence.
10. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
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procedural roadblocks.11 For example, in Schlup v. Delo,12 the
defendant used his claim of actual innocence as a gateway to argue
his ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct
claims, not as a substantive claim in and of itself.13 The applicable
standard when using innocence as a “gateway” claim was described
by the Court in Schlup as one that “imposes a lower burden of proof
than the ‘clear and convincing’ standard.”14
The second, much more contested method for arguing a
postconviction claim of actual innocence is using the fact of
innocence itself as the basis of a constitutional violation. Essentially,
in this context, the proponent argues that continued incarceration or
execution violates the Eighth Amendment because new evidence
proves the conviction is invalid—that is, the defendant is factually
innocent of the crime of conviction. This type of claim is commonly
referred to as a “freestanding” claim of innocence—in the sense that
it is not attached to another substantive constitutional claim or
claims.15
The Supreme Court considered “freestanding” claims of
innocence in the context of capital cases in Herrera.16 Although six
justices at least hypothetically agreed17 that such claims could be
presented by individuals who had been sentenced to death,18 there
was widespread disagreement regarding the standard of proof that
should apply to such claims. The majority opinion, authored by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, referred to a vague “extraordinarily high”

11. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
12. 513 U.S. 298.
13. Id. at 306.
14. Id. at 327.
15. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404–05.
16. See id. at 390–98.
17. Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and O’Connor "assume[d] for the sake of argument” that
such a claim would exist (at least with respect to the execution of an innocent person), id. at 417,
while Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter indicated that they would affirmatively recognize
the existence of such claim, id. at 435 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Thomas
indicated that freestanding claims of innocence are not constitutionally cognizable. Id. at 428
(Scalia, J., concurring).
18. The majority affirmatively held, quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963),
that “absent an accompanying constitutional violation, . . . [a claim] of actual innocence was not
cognizable because . . . ‘the existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt
of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.’” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 397–
98 (citations omitted).
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standard19 but avoided further definition by finding that, regardless
of the specific test applied, Herrera did not meet it. Justice O’Connor
wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined,
indicating that the Court need not articulate a standard of proof at
that time, but opining, for the sake of argument, that “a truly
persuasive demonstration of actual innocence” would render an
execution unconstitutional.20 Justice White, in his concurring
opinion, indicated that a freestanding innocence claim would, at the
very least, require the petitioner to “show that based on proffered
newly discovered evidence and the entire record before the jury that
convicted him, ‘no rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’”21
Finally, Justice Blackmun noted in his dissenting opinion
(joined by Justices Stevens and Souter) that the standard for a
petitioner seeking to overturn his conviction on a claim of actual
innocence should be that he “probably is innocent.”22 He compared
this standard to the one applied to a gateway innocence claim, which
requires a petitioner to show a “fair probability that, in light of all the
evidence, . . . the trier of the facts would have entertained a
reasonable doubt of his guilt,”23 and indicated that it is an
appropriately higher burden for the petitioner to meet. As opposed to
“raising doubt about his guilt” in light of the new evidence, the
petitioner in a postconviction innocence hearing would have the
burden of actually proving his innocence under a preponderance of
the evidence standard.24 According to Justice Blackmun, this
standard would balance the burdens appropriately in a postconviction
setting—where the presumption of innocence no longer applies—and
give due deference to the trial process.25
19. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
20. Id. at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324
(1979)).
22. Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
23. Id. (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 455, n.17 (1986)). This standard was
further clarified in Schlup, where the Court held that a petitioner asserting a gateway claim of
actual innocence must show that “in light of new evidence . . . it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).
24. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 442–43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
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In addition to the varying degrees of suggested standards for the
hypothetically recognized freestanding claim of actual innocence, the
Court’s Herrera decision also generated a great deal of confusion
regarding the appropriate remedy that would apply if a petitioner
were able to successfully present such a claim. The issue upon which
the Court granted certiorari was “whether the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments permit a state to execute an individual who is innocent
of the crime for which he or she was convicted and sentenced to
death.”26 This question seemingly limited any remedy to
commutation of the death sentence imposed. Although Herrera
himself urged that a new trial would not necessarily be required, the
majority indicated that any habeas remedy must necessarily include
release of the prisoner and the possibility of a new trial, stating that
“[i]t would be a rather strange jurisprudence, in these circumstances,
which held that under our Constitution [an innocent person] could
not be executed, but that he could spend the rest of his life in
prison.”27 Additionally, one of the reasons for the “extraordinarily
high” standard noted by the majority was the “enormous burden that
having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on
the States.”28
Furthermore, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun
indicated that shifting the burden of proof to the petitioner and
requiring a higher burden than that imposed for a gateway innocence
claim were appropriate given the difficulties inherent in retrying an
older case and the possibility that the “actual-innocence proceeding
thus may constitute the final word on whether the defendant may be
punished.”29 Based on this statement, it is clear that Justice
Blackmun anticipated the reversal of the petitioner’s original
conviction and a new trial as the appropriate remedy for freestanding
innocence claims.

26. Brief for Petitioner, Herrera, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (No. 91-7328), 1992 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 422, at *5.
27. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 405. Ironically, the Court’s holding in Schlup—that an individual
who can show that, “in light of the new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable
juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” may nevertheless be
constitutionally executed—seems an even stranger jurisprudence to postulate. Schlup, 513 U.S. at
299.
28. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
29. Id. at 443.
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Ten years later, in House v. Bell,30 the issue of applicable
remedy still appeared to be unresolved.31 In this case, the petitioner
presented both a gateway claim of innocence and a freestanding
claim of innocence.32 A mixture of judges from the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered remedies ranging from sentencing
relief, to a new trial, to outright release.33 Two years later, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether House had
presented sufficient evidence of either a gateway or freestanding
claim of innocence.34 This gave the Court the opportunity not only to
specifically define the standard for a freestanding claim of actual
innocence but also to clarify the available remedies. However, it
chose to do neither. Instead, the Court found that House met the
Schlup standard for gateway claims and remanded the case for
consideration of his ineffective assistance and prosecutorial
misconduct claims.35 With regard to House’s freestanding claim of
innocence, the Court stated:
House urges the Court to answer the question left open in
Herrera and hold not only that freestanding innocence
claims are possible but also that he has established one.
We decline to resolve this issue. We conclude here,
much as in Herrera, that whatever burden a hypothetical
freestanding innocence claim would require, this petitioner
has not satisfied it. . . . The sequence of the Court’s
decisions in Herrera and Schlup—first leaving unresolved
the status of freestanding claims and then establishing the
gateway standard—implies at the least that Herrera
requires more convincing proof of innocence than Schlup. It

30. 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
31. See generally id. (explaining that there is little resolution of what remedy should be used
for freestanding innocence claims).
32. Id. at 554.
33. Id. at 535–36. In the initial review of House’s habeas petition, one judge indicated that
House “present[ed] a strong claim for habeas relief, at least at the sentencing phase of the case.”
Id. at 535 (quoting House v. Bell, 331 F.3d 767, 787 (6th Cir. 2002) (Gilman, J., dissenting)). On
return to a fifteen judge en banc panel, six judges found that evidence of petitioner’s innocence
was so compelling that he was entitled to “immediate release” under Justice White’s standard for
freestanding innocence claims, and another judge found that the new evidence entitled petitioner
to a new trial under the same standard. Id. at 535–36.
34. Id. at 536.
35. Id. at 555.
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follows, given the closeness of the Schlup question here,
that House’s showing falls short of the threshold implied in
Herrera.36
Although the Court refused to provide any further definition to
the Herrera standard (or even formally recognize it), some
clarification can be gleaned from its discussion of House’s gateway
innocence claim. Initially, the Court affirmed the standard announced
in Schlup for such claims: “prisoners asserting innocence as a
gateway to defaulted claims must establish that, in light of new
evidence, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”37 After
reviewing the new evidence presented by House, the Court found
that “although the issue is close, . . . this is the rare case where—had
the jury heard all the conflicting testimony—it is more likely than
not that no reasonable juror viewing the record as a whole would
lack reasonable doubt” as to the guilt of the defendant.38
To truly understand the demanding nature of the proof required
by the Court to satisfy this “lesser” standard, a review of the
evidence presented by House is necessary. An en banc panel of the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals conducted an exhaustive review of
this evidence, which was summarized in Chief Judge Merritt’s
dissenting opinion as follows:
Through extremely persuasive and affirmative evidence that
Mr. Muncey killed his wife, House has shown that it is
highly probable that he is completely innocent of any
wrongdoing whatever. There is no reasonable basis for
disbelieving the six witnesses who now incriminate Mr.
Muncey as the perpetrator of the crime. The most
compelling part of this new testimony involves his
confession to the murder in front of two witnesses who have
no connection to House and no bias against Mr. Muncey.
Furthermore, before his wife’s body was even located, he
solicited a neighbor to fabricate an alibi on his behalf. He
was heard returning home around the time of the murder.

36. Id. at 554–55 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 536–37 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).
38. Id. at 554.
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And considering his history of domestic violence and his
wife’s plans to leave him he had a motive to kill. In
contrast, there is no evidence of a motive for House. All of
the state’s physical evidence, both blood and semen,
allegedly tying House to the murder, has been effectively
rebutted. The new body of evidence as a whole so
completely undermines the case against House and
establishes a persuasive case against Muncey that, had it
been presented at trial, no rational juror could have found
evidence sufficient for conviction.39
Not only did House present persuasive evidence that the
victim’s husband was the actual killer, he rebutted, in its entirety, the
forensic evidence that was presented and used by the prosecution at
the trial not only as affirmative proof of House’s presence at the
scene of the crime but also of his alleged motive for the killing.40
Given this evidence, it is not surprising that seven of the fifteen
judges sitting on the en banc panel found that this evidence met the
“extraordinarily high” Herrera standard.41 However, even with the
persuasively convincing evidence presented by House, the Supreme
Court found that his claim just barely satisfied the less demanding
gateway-claim standard.42 If the Herrera freestanding claim standard
is, in fact, higher than the Schlup gateway standard, it is no wonder
that the Supreme Court has yet to find a set of facts that satisfies it.
Were it not for the fact that House had substantive constitutional
claims to argue in addition to his innocence, he likely would have
been executed by now.43
39. House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668, 708 (6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., dissenting), rev’d, 547 U.S.
518 (2006).
40. House, 547 U.S. at 552–53. DNA testing revealed that the semen that was found on the
victim’s clothing was from her husband, not House (thereby eliminating the rape motive asserted
by the prosecution), and the blood stains found on House’s jeans, although belonging to the
victim, were “too similar to blood collected during the autopsy . . . to have come from [the
victim’s] body on the night of the crime.” Id. at 542.
41. House, 386 F.3d at 708 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
42. House, 547 U.S. at 554.
43. House v. Bell, No. 3:96-cv-883, 2007 WL 4568444, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 20, 2007).
Upon remand, a United States district court in the Eastern District of Tennessee granted Mr.
House’s habeas petition in part and remanded the case to the trial court to await the State’s
decision regarding reprosecution. Id. On July 2, 2008, House was released on bail. Released from
Death Row, but Not Exonerated, NBCNEWS.COM (July 24, 2008, 10:35 PM EST),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25836468#UDZyCmj6nFI. On May 12, 2009, the State dropped
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Three years following its holding in House, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in a capital case involving a freestanding claim of
innocence in the highly publicized and controversial case of Troy
Davis.44 In a memorandum opinion, the Court remanded the case to
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
for a hearing on Davis’ innocence claim, based on the fact that
seven of the State’s key witnesses . . . recanted their trial
testimony; several individuals have implicated the State’s
principal witness as the shooter; and no court, state or
federal, has ever conducted a hearing to assess the
reliability of the score of [postconviction] affidavits that, if
reliable, would satisfy the threshold showing for a truly
persuasive demonstration of actual innocence.45
This memorandum opinion fell short of holding that a Herrera
claim had been established, but it is at least an implicit recognition of
freestanding innocence claims and gives some additional insight into
the applicable standard for such claims. On remand, the district
court, choosing not to “dodge the question . . . squarely before it,”46
ruled on both the cognizability of a freestanding claim of innocence
and the applicable standard. After finding that execution of an
innocent person would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the court went on to do what the Supreme Court
scrupulously avoided in all prior innocence cases—it evaluated and
ruled on the applicable standard for such claims.47
Davis argued that the appropriate standard is the showing of “a
clear probability that any reasonable juror would have reasonable
doubt about his guilt.”48 He quantified a “clear probability” at “a
sixty percent chance.”49 On the other hand, the State argued, based
on Justice White’s concurrence in Herrera and Chief Justice
all charges against House due to lack of evidence. David G. Savage, Murder Charges Dropped
Because of DNA Evidence, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2009
/may/13/nation/na-court-dna13.
44. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court granted writ of
certiorari in this case).
45. Id. at 1 (internal citations omitted).
46. In re Davis, No. CV 409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *37 n.15 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010),
cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. Humphrey, 131 S. Ct. 1787, 1788 (2011).
47. Id. at *43–45.
48. Id. at *44.
49. Id.
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Robert’s dissent in House, that the appropriate standard is that “no
rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.”50
The district court found that the Supreme Court’s innocence
jurisprudence supported a standard that fell somewhere between the
two proposed standards.51 In reaching this conclusion, the court
relied on the Supreme Court’s description of burdens in Schlup,
which noted that “a standard of proof represents an attempt to
instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our
society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”52 After a
comparison of the different standards of proof adopted by the
Supreme Court in postconviction claims involving an actual
innocence component, the district court found that the appropriate
standard was one in which the petitioner must “show by clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted
him in the light of the new evidence.”53 The district court found this
standard to be both an appropriate balance between the Schlup “more
likely than not” standard, which applies to gateway claims of
innocence, and the Jackson “no rational trier of fact” standard, which
applies to claims contesting the sufficiency of the evidence in a given
case. It also concluded this standard was sufficient to satisfy the
“extraordinarily high” requirement referred to in Herrera.54 Based on
this standard, the district court then found that Davis had failed to
prove his innocence and was, thus, not entitled to relief.55 The
Supreme Court denied Davis’s petition for certiorari to review the

50. Id. at *44; Answer-Response and Brief in Support on Behalf of Respondent to Petition
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 51–52, In re Davis, No. CV 409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D.
Ga. Aug. 24, 2010).
51. In re Davis, at *44–45.
52. Id. at *44 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
53. Id. at *45.
54. Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 392 (1993);
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 308 (1979)).
55. Id. at *59–61.
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district court’s conclusion.56 He was executed on September 21,
2011.57
As noted by Justice Blackmun in his Herrera dissent, “the
legitimacy of punishment is inextricably intertwined with guilt.”58
This pronouncement is especially true within the context of capital
punishment. As discussed in the following section, the Supreme
Court’s capital jurisprudence is based, in large part, on retributive
principles that require actual guilt59 as a legitimating principle,
thereby necessitating an effective mechanism for considering
postconviction claims of innocence.
II. RETRIBUTIVE THEMES IN THE
SUPREME COURT’S CAPITAL JURISPRUDENCE
Over the last ten years, the Supreme Court has developed a firm
line of Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence, categorically
invalidating the application of the death penalty in many instances.60
In all of these cases, the Court applied its traditional two-part
analysis consisting of an examination of national consensus and an
application of its own independent judgment as the final arbiter of all
things constitutional.61 In its most recent decisions, the Court has
placed a greater emphasis on the independent-judgment facet of the
Eighth Amendment analysis.62 Within this part of the analysis, the
Court determines whether the application of the death penalty
furthers any legitimate penological purpose.63 According to the
56. Davis v. Humphrey, 131 S. Ct. 1787, 1788 (2011).
57. Colleen Curry & Michael S. James, Troy Davis Executed After Stay Denied by Supreme
Court, ABC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/troy-davis-executed-stay-denied
-supreme-court/story?id=14571862#.UFym1ULIHpg.
58. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 433–34 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that six judges called for House’s immediate release, while a seventh judge
indicated that a new trial was necessitated under the circumstances).
59. “Actual” guilt should be distinguished from the notion of “legal” guilt discussed in
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Herrera, which occurs when an individual is convicted
in a trial that is free of constitutional error. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419–20 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
60. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2658 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
578 (2005); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
61. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641; Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Ford, 477 U.S. 399.
62. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2658; Roper, 543 U.S. at 574–75.
63. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553. This focus is a departure from the Court’s discussion of
penological justifications as something separate from the overall proportionality analysis in the
cases immediately following the invalidation of death penalty statutes nationwide in Furman v.
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Court, the only two legitimate social purposes that can be served by
the death penalty are deterrence and retribution.64 Moreover, in its
most recent decisions, the Court has focused mainly on retribution as
the supporting rationale for the most severe punishment available.65
A. Retributive Theory Models
Retributive theory is based on two main premises: (1) that
individuals act based on free will;66 and (2) that it is appropriate to
inflict proportional punishment on individuals who commit criminal
wrongs.67 Unlike the utilitarian theory, which looks to the future and
generally requires some connection between punishment and the
good of society as a whole, retribution focuses solely on the crime
committed by the offender and the proportionality of the punishment
at issue.
Although the retributive theory operates on the basic premise of
“just deserts,” several different variations have developed over the
years. Initially, retribution can be divided into two main components:
negative retributivism and positive retributivism.68 Negative
retributivism focuses solely on the immorality of punishing an
innocent person—positing that “the retributive principle of just
deserts is a necessary condition of punishment.”69 This form of
retributivism is widely accepted as a legitimate limitation on
utilitarian theory, which does not automatically condemn the

Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 332–33 (1972) (explaining that punishments that are excessive violate the
constitution). See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (explaining the
importance in analyzing the proportionality of a punishment).
64. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
65. See generally Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2661–62 (explaining that retribution is the
primary rationale for using the death penalty); Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (explaining that
retribution is a primary rationale for using the death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
319 (2002) (explaining that retribution is a primary rationale for using the death penalty).
66. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 173 (1987) (explaining that the retributive rationale
for capital punishment is inappropriate where the defendant did not have the intent to commit the
crime).
67. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,
149 (1987)) (explaining that “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence
must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender”).
68. Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good Be
Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451 (1990) (citing J.L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive
Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1982, at 3, 4).
69. Id. at 1451.
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punishment of an innocent person if the benefit to society as a whole
outweighs the burden imposed on the innocent person.
Positive retributivism, on the other hand, is a much broader
concept that not only decries the punishment of an innocent person,
but also affirmatively requires punishment of the guilty—holding
that “retributive justice is a necessary and sufficient condition of
punishment.”70 This form of retributive theory is more controversial
than negative retributivism, but it is commonly accepted as one of
many legitimate penological goals.71 Positive retributivism, however,
has several subsets, which can be classified into two main categories:
“assaultive” and “protective.”72
While there are variations within each category of positive
retributivism, assaultive retribution can generally be described as a
vindictive, vengeance-based theory that “regard[s] criminals as rather
like noxious insects to be ground under the heel of society.”73 At the
other end of the positive retributivist spectrum is the protective
variation, which views punishment as a means of securing moral
balance in society—“that not only does a just society have a right to
punish voluntary wrongdoers, but that criminals also have a right to
be punished.”74
One version of the protective variation of retributive theory has
been described by Professor Joshua Dressler as follows:
As Professor Herbert Morris has explained, society is
composed of rules that forbid various form[s] of harmful
conduct; compliance with these rules burdens each member
of the community that exercises self-restraint. These same
rules provide a benefit in the form of “noninterference by
others with what each person values, such . . . as
continuance of life and bodily security.” As long as
everyone follows the rules, an equilibrium exists—everyone
is similarly benefitted and burdened. If a person fails to
70. Id.
71. See generally Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (explaining that retribution is one
“legitimate reason to punish”).
72. Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1168–69 (1980).
73. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 3 (1988) (citing 2
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81–82 (1883)).
74. Dressler, supra note 68, at 1452.
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exercise self-restraint when he could have—when he
renounces a burden that others have assumed—he destroys
the balance. He becomes a free rider: He has the benefits of
the system of rules, without accepting the same burdens.
Thus, a criminal owes a debt to society. It is fair, therefore,
to require payment of the debt, i.e., punishment equal or
proportional to the debt owed (i.e. the crime committed).75
Another variation of protective retributivism views the
punishment as a means of restoring the victim’s worth as a human
being.76 As noted by Professor Jean Hampton:
[Criminal] conduct causes a moral injury, which means that
it expresses and does damage to the acknowledgement and
realization of the value of the victim. . . . [R]etribution is a
response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value
of the victim denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the
construction of an event that not only repudiates the
action’s message of superiority over the victim but does so
in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their
humanity.77
Essentially, this theory legitimizes punishment as a method for
restoring a victim’s societal and personal worth—focusing more on
bringing the victim back up to his or her rightful place in society than
on bringing the wrongdoer back down to his or her rightful place.
The Supreme Court has never specifically identified the form of
retribution it considers appropriate under the Eighth Amendment. In
fact, its capital jurisprudence includes references to both positive and
negative retributive theory and to multiple variations within the
positive retribution category. For example, in Gregg v. Georgia,78
one of the Court’s first cases following its categorical rejection of
death penalty statutes nationwide in Furman v. Georgia,79 the Court
described retribution as “an expression of the community’s belief
that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity
75. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW: THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 17–
18 (5th ed. 2009) (citing Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 Monist 475, 477 (1968)).
76. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1686 (1992).
77. Id. at 1685–86.
78. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
79. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.”80 The
Court explained that retribution is accepted as a legitimate basis for
the imposition of a death sentence because
[t]he instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal
justice serves an important purpose in promoting the
stability of a society governed by law. When people begin
to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to
impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of anarchy—of
self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.81
These early statements seem to lean heavily toward assaultive forms
of retribution—focusing on punishment for the sake of punishment.
However, in the Court’s more recent capital jurisprudence, it
refers to retribution in terms of both assaultive and protective
theories. For example, in Roper v. Simmons,82 Justice Kennedy
seemingly embraced both theories with the following statement
rejecting the application of the death penalty to juveniles: “Whether
viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral outrage or as
an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case
for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.”83
Additionally, in its most recent capital decision, Kennedy v.
Louisiana,84 Justice Kennedy described retribution as both a
reflection of “society’s and the victim’s interests in seeing that the
offender is repaid for the hurt he caused”85 and a mechanism for
“balanc[ing] the wrong to the victim.”86 The former statement
80. 428 U.S. at 184; see also id. at 184 n.30 (“Punishment is the way in which society
expresses its denunciation of wrong doing: and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential
that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the
great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishment as being
deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else . . . . The truth is that some crimes are so
outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong-doer deserves it,
irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.” (quoting ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 207 (1950))).
81. Id. at 183 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
82. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
83. Id. at 571.
84. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
85. Id. at 2662.
86. Id.
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focuses on the more vindictive form of assaultive retribution, and the
latter refers to the moral balancing that is the basis of protective
retribution. In Graham v. Florida,87 Justice Kennedy, addressing the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause generally, further noted “the
essential principle that, under the Eighth Amendment, the State must
respect the human attributes even of those who have committed
serious crimes.”88
Therefore, it appears that the Court applies a mixture of
retributive theories within its Eighth Amendment analysis. However,
regardless of the differences between the various theories of
retribution, each accepts and demands one basic premise—only the
guilty can be punished. This concept is especially true within the
context of the death penalty. Unlike utilitarian theories, which might
allow for the punishment of an innocent person (if it served the
“greater good”),89 retributive theory is only legitimately served if
punishment fitting the crime is imposed on a factually guilty person.
This realization is incorporated in all of the Supreme Court’s
decisions discussing retribution as a legitimizing theory for the
imposition of a particular punishment. Most notably, in capital cases,
the Court has found an insufficient nexus between retributive theory
and the death penalty when categories of individuals and victims
make the risk of wrongful conviction a possibility.90
B. Retributive Theory,
Wrongful Conviction,
and the Death Penalty
As noted above, when evaluating a categorical challenge to the
imposition of a particular sentence, the Court first determines
whether there is a national consensus for or against the punishment
in the context at issue. Regardless of the results of this initial
determination, the Court then independently determines whether
imposing the particular punishment would violate the Eighth

87.
88.
89.
90.
(2002).

130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
Id. at 2021.
See Dressler, supra note 68, at 1452.
E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
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Amendment.91 In this part of the analysis, the Court “considers
whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate
penological goals,”92 which include, in the context of the death
penalty, retribution and deterrence.93
Although both retribution and deterrence are recognized as goals
that may legitimately be furthered by the imposition of capital
punishment, the Court has never assigned deterrence a significant
role in the analysis. In fact, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court noted,
“Statistical attempts to evaluate the worth of the death penalty as a
deterrent to crimes by potential offenders have occasioned a great
deal of debate. The results simply have been inconclusive.”94 The
Court went on to assume that the death penalty may have some
deterrent value, leaving it to the states to determine the particular
effect within each jurisdiction.95 However, the Court placed a greater
emphasis on retributive theory as a legitimate penological
justification for the imposition of such a sentence.96 In more recent
years, the issue of the death penalty’s deterrent effect has drawn
much more heated criticism.97 In fact, some justices have rejected the
viability of deterrence as a legitimating factor for the death penalty
altogether.98

91. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (“Community consensus, while ‘entitled to great weight,’ is
not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.” (quoting Kennedy, 128 S.
Ct. at 2658)).
92. Id.; see also Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2661 (examining whether a capital sentence for the
crime of child rape satisfied the “distinct social purposes served by the death penalty”); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–75 (2005) (considering whether a capital sentence imposed on a
juvenile would further any legitimate penological goals); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–20 (explaining
why the accepted justifications for the death penalty could not support the execution of an
intellectually disabled individual).
93. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
94. Id. at 184–85.
95. Id. at 185–86.
96. Id. (explaining that retribution was a proper consideration to weigh in determining
whether the death penalty should be imposed).
97. See generally Michael L. Radelet & Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide
Rates?: The Views of Leading Criminologists, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2009)
(arguing that the death penalty is not a deterrent); Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers,
Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1
(1996) (arguing that the death penalty is not a deterrent).
98. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (“[R]etribution provides the main
justification for capital punishment”) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Spanziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 477–81 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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Given the importance of the Court’s independent analysis in
death penalty challenges and the overriding focus on retribution as
the most viable penological theory justifying capital punishment, the
Court’s application of this theory should be accorded great weight
within an Eighth Amendment analysis. Determining the role of
retribution in an Eighth Amendment analysis is best accomplished by
examining the Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence.
In Atkins v. Virginia,99 the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on an “intellectually
disabled” individual.100 In assessing whether the execution of such an
individual meaningfully contributes to retribution, the Court
considered the increased possibility of false confessions and
wrongful executions that such individuals faced.101 The Court noted
its concern that the possibility of inappropriately imposed death
sentences “is enhanced . . . by the possibility of false confessions”
and the fact that intellectually disabled defendants “may be less able
to give meaningful assistance to their counsel.”102 Ultimately, these
factors—along with the general evidentiary difficulties103
encountered by such intellectually disabled individuals—led the
Court to find that they “face a special risk of wrongful execution.”104
Although the Court’s retribution analysis also focused on the lesser
culpability of this group of individuals, its recognition of the risk of
wrongful conviction and wrongful execution105 is compelling. In
99. 536 U.S. 304, (2002).
100. Id. at 307 (explaining that the issue in the case is whether executions of “intellectually
disabled” individuals are “‘cruel and unusual punishments’ prohibited by the Eighth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution”). The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (formerly known as the American Association on Mental Retardation or AAMR)
suggests that the term “intellectual disability” is more appropriate than the traditional reference to
“mental retardation.” Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation:
Understanding the Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES J. 116, 118 (2007).
101. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002).
102. Id.
103. The Court found that intellectually disabled defendants had a “lesser ability” to “make a
persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating
factors.” Id. at 320. The Court also noted that such individuals are “typically poor witnesses, and
their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.” Id. at
320–21.
104. Id. at 321.
105. “Wrongful execution” refers to insufficient evidence to support a death sentence, as
opposed to insufficient evidence to support the underlying conviction. Id. at 305, 319.
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fact, the Court specifically voiced its concern regarding wrongful
convictions in the context of the death penalty as follows:
Despite the heavy burden that the prosecution must
shoulder in capital cases, we cannot ignore the fact that in
recent years a disturbing number of inmates on death row
have been exonerated. These exonerations have included at
least one [intellectually disabled] person who unwittingly
confessed to a crime that he did not commit.106
The mere possibility of either a wrongful conviction or death
sentence was enough, in combination with the other factors
considered, to lead the Court to conclude that intellectually disabled
individuals should be categorically excluded from application of the
death penalty.107
This trend continued in Kennedy v. Louisiana, in which the
Court addressed whether the Eighth Amendment categorically
excludes the death penalty in child rape cases.108 In its discussion of
retribution, the Court noted:
There are . . . serious systemic concerns in prosecuting
the crime of child rape that are relevant to the
constitutionality of making it a capital offense. The problem
of unreliable, induced, and even imagined child testimony
means there is a “special risk of wrongful execution” in
some child rape cases. This undermines, at least to some
degree, the meaningful contribution of the death penalty to
legitimate goals of punishment.
. . . Although capital punishment does bring retribution, and
the legislature here has chosen to use it for this end, its
judgment must be weighed, in deciding the constitutional
question, against the special risks of unreliable testimony
with respect to this crime.109

106. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320, n.25.
107. Such factors include the lesser culpability of an intellectually disabled individual who,
by definition, has a diminished capacity "to understand and process information, to communicate,
to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control
impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.” Id. at 318.
108. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (discussing whether a categorical rule
exempting child rape from the death penalty was appropriate).
109. Id. at 2663 (citation omitted).
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Similar to its holding in Atkins, the Court again instituted a
categorical ban on the imposition of the death penalty based—in
significant part—on the mere possibility of a wrongful conviction.110
Instead of coming from characteristics specific to the defendant, this
time the threat of wrongful conviction was generated by the status of
the victim.111 In both instances, the Court found that the possibility
of wrongful conviction eliminated any meaningful contribution the
death penalty might have had to retributive theory.112
Even outside the context of the death penalty, the Court has
viewed the possibility of inaccurate sentencing decisions and
wrongful convictions as significant factors in its Eighth Amendment
analysis. In Graham v. Florida, the Court discussed the issues that
arise with juvenile defendants:
[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put
them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings.
Juveniles mistrust adults and have limited understandings of
the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional
actors within it. They are less likely than adults to work
effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense . . .
[which is] likely to impair the quality of a juvenile
defendant’s representation. . . . A categorical rule [against
the imposition of a life without parole sentence] avoids the
risk that, as a result of these difficulties, a court or jury will
erroneously conclude that a particular juvenile is
sufficiently culpable to deserve [such sentence] for a
nonhomicide [crime].113
Whether relating to the inability of an accused to work with
counsel effectively, or to reliability issues inherent with certain
categories of witnesses, the Supreme Court has consistently found
that the risks of wrongful conviction and punishment are not only
relevant to the Eighth Amendment analysis but also militate in favor
of constitutional restrictions on sentencing.114
110. Id. at 2645.
111. Id. at 2641.
112. Id. at 444; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
113. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (citations omitted).
114. Id. (holding that life without parole cannot be imposed on a juvenile for a non-homicide
offense); see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 413 (explaining that there should be a constitutional
restriction on the death penalty for individuals who raped children); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319
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In response to the Supreme Court’s confusing jurisprudence on
the viability of freestanding claims of innocence, at least one lower
court has considered the issue of retribution specifically as it relates
to a postconviction claim of innocence in a capital case. In In re
Davis,115 a federal district court in the Southern District of Georgia
recognized the viability of a freestanding claim of innocence based,
in part, on the fact that “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that
a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal offender.”116 The court went on to
compare the theory of retribution to the idea of revenge:
While retribution and revenge overlap, they are not the
same. Retribution aims to restore a harmonious balance to
society; revenge sates individual desires. Retribution
restores balance by providing a wrongdoer with his just
deserts. However, balance is restored only with accuracy; a
mislaid blow, no matter how swift, only increases the moral
imbalance by imposing additional unjustified suffering.
Revenge, meanwhile, requires only that another suffer as
much as the victim. It desires swiftness, but requires
minimal accuracy. Revenge may be derived from either the
deserving party or a simple scapegoat. When retribution is
taken against the correct party, both revenge and retribution
may be had, but neither should be mistaken for the other.117
Ultimately, the court found, under a traditional Eighth Amendment
categorical analysis, that the execution of an individual who could
make a postconviction showing of innocence constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.118
Taken as a whole, this body of jurisprudence illustrates the
overriding importance of retributive theory in the context of death
penalty cases and the intimate connection between and among
(explaining that the death penalty as applied to mentally incompetent individuals is
unconstitutional and should be categorically restricted).
115. No. CV 409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010), cert. denied sub nom.
Davis v. Humphrey, 131 S. Ct. 1787, 1788 (2011).
116. Id. at *43 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
117. Id. at *43, n.35 (citation omitted) (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028
(2010); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
118. Id. at *43. The court ultimately concluded that Davis was not entitled to relief because he
was unable to make a sufficient showing of actual innocence. Id. at *61.
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retribution, actual guilt, and execution. With these concepts in mind,
the following section discusses how freestanding innocence claims
should be addressed in the context of capital cases.
III. ADDRESSING INNOCENCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF PENDING EXECUTIONS
The Supreme Court’s reliance on retributive theory as a
significant legitimating factor for the imposition of a death penalty
and retribution’s determinative requirement of actual guilt119 both
support a tiered approach to the consideration of freestanding actualinnocence claims in capital cases. Under this tiered system of review,
different standards should apply depending on the remedy at issue,
with a lower standard applying to commutation of sentence, as
opposed to reversal of conviction and the possibility of a new trial.
As discussed below, this tiered approach is supported by the
Supreme
Court’s
Eighth
Amendment
retribution-based
jurisprudence, and it effectively balances society’s interest in
avoiding the execution of an innocent person against the burden
inherent in retrying potentially stale cases. The approach that best
implements Eighth Amendment principles is one that allows
freestanding claims of innocence in capital cases and requires (1)
commutation of a death sentence if the petitioner can show that in
light of new evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable
juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt,”120 and (2) a new trial where petitioner can prove his
innocence under a higher standard, such as the clear and convincing
evidence standard adopted by the district court in In re Davis.121
It should initially be noted that it is not unusual for the Court to
consider postconviction impediments to execution. In Ford v.
Wainwright,122 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the execution of a mentally incompetent person and that a convicted
defendant is entitled to a hearing prior to execution if competency is

119. This is true regardless of the particular theory of retribution at issue. See supra Part I.
120. This is the same standard the Court applies to gateway innocence claims, as announced
in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).
121. See supra Part II.
122. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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an issue.123 As noted by Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion
in Herrera, the Court’s decision in Ford recognizes that “capital
defendants may be entitled to further proceedings because of an
intervening development even though they have been validly
convicted and sentenced to death.”124 The Herrera majority
discounted any reliance on Ford as supporting the viability of
freestanding innocence claims, but it did so based on the misguided
notion that “Ford’s claim went to a matter of punishment—not
guilt,” and was therefore “properly examined within the purview of
the Eighth Amendment.”125 This argument, however, does not give
proper consideration to the definitive connection between retributive
theory and actual guilt. As noted by Justice Blackmun, “the
legitimacy of punishment is inextricably intertwined with guilt.”126
This concept is especially true in the context of capital cases, where
the legality of the punishment is so closely tied to retributive theory
and its accompanying requirement of actual guilt.
The Court’s decision in Ford bears this out, as it relies in large
part on the lack of retributive effect in finding that the execution of
an insane person violates the Eighth Amendment.127 As noted by
Justice Marshall in the majority opinion, “We may seriously question
the retributive value of executing a person who has no
comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his
fundamental right to life.”128
The differences of opinion among Supreme Court justices and
lower courts regarding the applicable standard for a freestanding
claim of innocence seems to derive primarily from confusion or
disagreement over the appropriate remedy for such a claim. The
Court’s concern regarding burdens associated with the relitigation of
guilt and innocence issues supports a higher standard for
freestanding claims of innocence where the requested remedy is
123. Id. at 410.
124. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 433 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 406.
126. Id. at 433–34.
127. The Court noted that “[m]ore recent commentators opine that the community's quest for
‘retribution’—the need to offset a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent ‘moral quality’—is
not served by execution of an insane person, which has a ‘lesser value’ than that of the crime for
which he is to be punished.” Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard & W. David
Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 387 (1962)).
128. Id. at 409.
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retrial. However, there is no reason why retrial—and its associated
“extraordinarily high” standard—must stand as the only option
available to the petitioner who can show that “it is more likely than
not” that he is innocent. Under such circumstances, it is more
appropriate to apply the remedy of commutation of sentence, as
opposed to foreclosing the petitioner from any relief at all and
proceeding with the execution of a person who is probably innocent.
Neither of the concerns noted by the Supreme Court in
Herrera—retrial burden129 and finality130—is triggered by the
commutation of a death sentence under a freestanding innocence
claim. Certainly, the Eighth Amendment requires more than turning
a blind eye131 to the probable execution of an innocent person under
the guise of “finality.” In the context of the death penalty, the finality
upon which the Eighth Amendment focuses concerns the punishment
at issue, not the criminal process.132 If it is more likely than not that
we are about to execute an innocent person, such punishment truly
does come “perilously close to simple murder.”133
A lower standard for commutation of a death sentence is also
supported by the Eighth Amendment and its reliance on retributive
theory, which requires more than the fiction of guilt derived from an
otherwise constitutionally sound conviction. Retribution demands
actual guilt as a legitimating premise for punishment—especially in
the context of the death penalty. As the Innocence Project has proven
time and time again,134 mistakes are made across the nation in the

129. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 392.
130. Id. at 426.
131. “This is not to say that our habeas jurisprudence casts a blind eye toward innocence.” Id.
at 404 (indicating that gateway claims are sufficient constitutional consideration of innocence).
132. The Supreme Court has noted on many occasions, most recently in Kennedy v.
Louisiana, that “death is different” as a class of punishment due to its severity and ultimate
finality. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2654 (2008) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 187 (1976)).
133. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
149–78 (2003) (discussing the exoneration of 98 death row prisoners between 1973 and 2001);
Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987); Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2012) (indicating 289 postconviction DNA exonerations in the history of the United States, 17 of which were individuals on
death row); O’Connor Questions Death Penalty, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-280_162-299592.html.
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criminal justice system135—even when constitutional requirements
are followed. To ignore these mistakes is to ignore the legitimating
premise of the death penalty itself.
The appropriate standard for commutation of a death sentence is
the less demanding “more likely than not” standard applied to
gateway innocence claims. In Schlup v. Delo the Court noted:
[A] standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society
thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. . . . [The
standard of proof thus reflects] the relative importance
attached to the ultimate decision.136
In Schlup, the Court explained that the primary difference
between a gateway claim of innocence and a freestanding claim of
innocence (and their correspondingly different standards) hinged on
the validity accorded to the original trials in each case.137 Because
gateway claims are accompanied by an assertion of constitutional
error at the trial level, the petitioner’s conviction is not “entitled to
the same degree of respect”138 as one “that is the product of an error
free trial,”139 as would be the case with freestanding claims.
Although this distinction may be relevant when the remedy requested
is a new trial, it is not applicable when the only issue under
consideration is the execution of an innocent person. When
135. As noted by Chief Judge Merritt in his dissenting opinion in House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 688,
709 (2004) (Meritt, C.J., dissenting):
High on the list of the causes for mistakes are the kinds of errors we see in this case:
the misinterpretation or abuse of scientific evidence, the adverse inferences drawn from
the prior record of a defendant, particularly one who is a stranger in the local
community, the failure of counsel to uncover (until it is too late) witnesses who could
exonerate the defendant, and the existence of one or more other suspects with a motive
to commit the offense. Once the initial trial and appeal have occurred, it is clear from
the studies that the state, and its officials who have prosecuted, sentenced and reviewed
the case, are inclined to persevere in the belief that the state was right all along. They
tend to close ranks and resist admission of error. Intelligent citizens who strongly
believe in the reliability of the capital sanction are also inclined to persevere in the
belief that a case raising the ‘embarrassing question’ will never really arise and close
ranks with the state in resisting the admission of error. This case is a good example of
how these errors can lead to the execution of a defendant who is actually innocent.
136. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 316.
139. Id.
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commutation of a death sentence is the applicable remedy, the Eighth
Amendment, with its retribution-based analysis, requires greater
reliability. Therefore, the underlying conviction should not be
accorded the same weight as it would carry otherwise, and the
standard applied to the petitioner can be appropriately lowered.
In the context of postconviction claims of innocence in capital
cases, the primary concerns to be weighed include the petitioner’s
interest in avoiding the injustice of a wrongful execution and the
systemic interests in finality, comity, and conservation of judicial
resources.140 The relative value assigned to each of these concerns
changes dramatically based on the particular remedy at issue. The
State’s interest in finality, as associated with the burden of retrying
cases, is virtually nonexistent when the only issue under
consideration is commutation of sentence. Any interest in finality
that the State might have in this context pales in comparison to the
individual’s interest in avoiding a wrongful execution based on a
claim of innocence. Conversely, if the remedy at issue is a new trial,
the relative value of the State’s concern increases and supports the
application of a greater burden on the petitioner.
The Court’s holding in Ford v. Wainwright also supports the
application of a lesser standard for claims relating solely to the
constitutionality of an execution.141 Although the Court left it to the
States to develop specific standards for a pre-execution competency
determination, including the burden of proof that must be met by an
individual claiming incompetency, its preferred standard is a
preponderance of the evidence.142 Although this analysis does not
require reconsideration of an issue previously litigated at trial, the
lower standard reflects the balancing of interests inherent when
considering an impending execution.
In summary, the tiered system of review proposed in this Article
would permit an individual submitting a freestanding claim of actual
innocence to argue for a new trial under the enhanced standard of
140. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986).
141. Id. at 427 (explaining “a constitutionally acceptable procedure may be far less formal
than a trial”).
142. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.7(c)–(f) cmt. at 295–
301 (1989); Richard J. Bonnie, The Death Penalty and Mental Illness: Mentally Ill Prisoners on
Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1173–74
(2005).
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review implied by the Court in Herrera143 or, if he is unable to meet
that standard, to seek commutation of his death sentence under the
lesser “more likely than not” standard applied to gateway innocence
claims. This system would accord appropriate deference to the
systemic interests in finality and preservation of prosecutorial and
judicial resources, confer appropriate weight to the substantial liberty
interests of the petitioner subject to execution, and give valid effect
to the requirements of the Eighth Amendment as it applies to capital
cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to exclude entire groups
of individuals144 and crimes145 from application of the death penalty
based on the mere speculative possibility that an innocent person
might be convicted and sentenced to death. Certainly, this Eighth
Amendment retribution-based concern also extends to a situation in
which an individual who has been convicted and sentenced to death
can make a colorable postconviction claim of innocence by showing
that, based on new evidence, “it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.”146 A tiered system of standards and remedies for
freestanding innocence claims best balances the concerns of all: the
petitioner, the State, and the Eighth Amendment.

143. The “clear and convincing” standard enunciated by the district court in In Re Davis is an
appropriately enhanced standard for a freestanding claim seeking a new trial. See supra Part I.
144. See generally Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (excluding juveniles from
application of a life without parole sentence for a non-homicide offense); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002) (excluding intellectually disabled individuals from the death penalty). Although
it was not specifically discussed within Roper v. Simmons, 504 U.S. 551 (2005), certainly the
same concern would weigh heavily against the imposition of a death sentence on a juvenile
defendant.
145. See generally Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (excluding the crime of
child rape from application of the death penalty).
146. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).

30

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

